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REMEDIES REVEALS THE “SEAMLESS WEB” 
CANDACE SAARI KOVACIC-FLEISCHER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Remedies is a course that consolidates many of the concepts learned in the 
first year of law school and some from the second. A typical Remedies course 
will reintroduce principles from constitutional law, compare and contrast torts 
and contracts, and apply criminal concepts in civil contexts. Teaching 
Remedies can be both challenging and rewarding. Challenging because it 
crosses a wide variety of subject areas. Rewarding because it weaves a variety 
of subject areas into the “seamless web” of the law, eliciting from students an 
occasional “aha.” 
Early classes in law school tend to separate courses into discrete subject 
areas, including Contracts, Torts, Property, Civil Procedure, Constitutional 
Law, and Criminal Law; later classes, into statutory areas such as 
Environmental Law, Antitrust, Securities, Intellectual Property, and 
Antidiscrimination, to name a few. In law schools where core first-year courses 
are limited to four hours in one semester, and many statutory courses limited to 
three, professors may well be unable to reach the remedial section of their 
courses or, if they do, must give it short shrift. Nor do most courses offer 
students an opportunity to compare and contrast legal theories to determine 
which would provide a client with the best relief. 
Most law schools offer Remedies as a stand-alone course. That at least 
three credit hours can be devoted to it demonstrates that remedial theory 
cannot be summarized into a few simple principles. Compounding its 
complexity is that some remedial principles are applicable across many subject 
areas while others diverge dramatically from subject to subject. At times, the 
same terminology can be used, unhelpfully, to express dramatically different 
concepts depending on the subject matter. 
As a result, I think remedies should be a capstone course that all students 
take after having some expertise in a variety of subject matters. I know of no 
 
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. J.D., Northeastern 
University School of Law; B.A., Wellesley College. I want to thank the dean and everyone at the 
Washington College of Law for ensuring that teaching is an important priority. I would also like 
to thank my coauthors, Grant Nelson, Jean Love, and the late Bob Leavell, for our many years of 
collaboration. 
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law school that offers Remedies as a first-year course. Most offer it to students 
in either their second or third years. While I think Remedies is best appreciated 
in the third year, difficulties law schools have in scheduling competing 
demands likely would prevent limiting it to third-year students. 
Below follow examples of how I teach students in Remedies to think 
across course lines while learning remedial theory. 
I.  EQUITY 
A. Injunctions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Constitutional Law 
One of the “aha” moments that comes early in the course involves Article 
III of the Constitution. My coauthors’ and my textbook begins with equity.1 
After covering temporary restraining orders (“TROs”), preliminary injunctions, 
and permanent injunctions, we study the appealability of each. The students 
read Chicago United Industries, Ltd. v. City of Chicago,2 and Romer v. Green 
Point Savings Bank.3 They discover that preliminary and permanent 
injunctions may be appealed, but not TROs unless they have the effect of a 
preliminary or permanent injunction. 
I ask, “Why not?” 
Possible answers include “judicial efficiency” and “fair opportunities for 
parties to present their case.” 
Students may point to the quote from Note 1 of the Text, which says that a 
goal of nonappealablity of TROs is “to give the trial court an opportunity to 
conduct a hearing in which there was a ‘full presentation of both sides’ prior to 
any exercise of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order.”4 Generally, 
there has not been a full presentation of the issues or evidence in a TRO 
hearing. As Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, the 
duration of a TRO is limited,5 and under specified circumstances a TRO even 
 
 1. See CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, JEAN C. LOVE & GRANT S. NELSON, EQUITABLE 
REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
TEXT]. 
 2. 445 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 148–52. 
 3. 27 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1994), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 153–58. 
 4. TEXT, supra note 1, at 152 (quoting Connell v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 240 F.2d 
414, 418 (5th Cir. 1957)). 
 5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 16–17. Rule 65 provides 
that a TRO expires no later than fourteen days after entry unless “for good cause” it is extended 
for a similar time or unless the adverse party consents to a longer duration. Id. Chicago United 
Industries applied Rule 65 when the stated expiration date was ten days after entry and the district 
court extended the duration of the TRO without the adverse party’s consent. 445 F.3d at 942–43. 
Most states either have adopted the Federal Rules or have similar counterparts, but I tell students 
to make sure they read the rule applicable to the jurisdiction in which they are litigating. 
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may be issued ex parte,6 with the restrained party able to file, on two days’ 
notice, a motion to vacate the order with the district judge.7 A preliminary 
injunction hearing is to follow in the district court, taking precedence over 
most other matters.8 
I have students discuss the considerations of administrative practicality and 
fairness supporting the nonappealability of a TRO. The courts of appeals 
cannot routinely be expected to hold emergency hearings each time a TRO that 
does not operate as a preliminary or permanent injunction is at issue. 
Furthermore, the ground is often shifting in a case that starts with a TRO 
motion. Rather than allowing immediate appellate review, the rule permits the 
district judge to weigh evidence that might not have been available at a TRO 
hearing. In addition, students should remember or be reminded that it is not the 
role of an appellate court to weigh evidence; rather, its role is only to 
determine both whether errors of law have been made and whether the findings 
are infected by erroneous assumptions of law or are clearly erroneous.9 
Having discussed the practical workings of a TRO proceeding, I move to 
the constitutional and statutory underpinnings of the proceedings. I want 
students to see how the Constitution governs even the nonappealability of 
TROs, and I want to enable students to review (or in some circumstance fill in 
what they missed) subjects covered in Civil Procedure and Constitutional Law 
courses. 
I ask, “Why else is a TRO not appealable? What authority does the court 
use to hold that TROs are not appealable?” 
A. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(a)(1).10 
Q. What is the significance of § 1291? 
A. Section 1291 provides that appellate courts “shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.”11 Thus, permanent 
injunctions are appealable. Because preliminary injunctions as well as TROs 
are interlocutory decrees, neither would be appealable but for § 1292(a)(1). 
Q. Where in § 1292(a)(1) does it say that TROs are not appealable? 
 
 6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A) (“The court may issue a temporary restraining order 
without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an 
affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition . . . .”). 
 7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(4). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to 
the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”). 
 10. I have posted both statutes on a website. They can also be displayed by a projector in 
class. 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
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Students are directed to the language of § 1292(a)(1): 
Except as provided . . . the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of   appeals 
from: 
  (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the 
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District 
Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges 
thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or 
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may 
be had in the Supreme Court;12 
Students see that § 1292(a)(1) does not include a mention of TROs. The 
students see that when they condense its language, the rule covers 
“[i]nterlocutory orders . . . granting . . . [or] refusing . . . injunctions,”13 but is 
silent as to “restraining orders.” Therefore, by silent implication TROs are not 
appealable. 
Q. Why can’t courts decide that the omission of the term “temporary 
restraining orders” should not preclude appealability of TROs? Why can’t such 
orders be implied in § 1292(a)(1) or included in the definition of injunctions? 
Why must it be interpreted so literally? 
At this point I refer students back to Chicago United Industries14 and 
Judge Posner’s interpretation of Rule 65. He said a “plausible reading” of the 
durational limit for a TRO would be to apply it only to the “issued without 
notice” provision in Rule 65.15 Judge Posner applied an earlier version of Rule 
65, but both that version and the current one contain the “without notice” 
provision. Current Rule 65(b)(2) provides: 
Every temporary restraining order issued without notice must state the date and 
hour it was issued . . . . The order expires at the time after entry—not to exceed 
14 days—that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for good cause, 
extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer 
extension.16 
 
 12. Id. § 1292(a)(1). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Chicago United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), as 
reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 148–52. 
 15. Id. at 946, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 151. 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2) (emphasis added), as reprinted in Text, supra note 1, at 16. The 
version of Rule 65 in force in 2006 provided: 
Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be indorsed with the date 
and hour of issuance . . . and shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to 
exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good 
cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the order is 
directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period. 
28 U.S.C. app. (2006) (amended 2007) (emphasis added). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] REMEDIES REVEALS THE “SEAMLESS WEB” 655 
Students can see from the language of Rule 65 that Judge Posner is correct 
about how the rule could be read. But then they note that he said that such a 
reading “would not make any sense” because “it would enable a district court 
to issue a preliminary injunction of indefinite duration without any possibility 
of defendant’s appealing, simply by calling the injunction a temporary 
restraining order and being careful to notify the defendant in advance of 
issuing it.”17 Judge Posner then concluded that even TROs issued with notice 
are limited in duration by Rule 65.18 
Judge Posner did not read the rule literally, nor did he look to the history of 
the rule to define its meaning.19 I ask, “Why should a judge read § 1292(a)(1) 
literally, or if not reading it literally, look to legislative intent to determine its 
meaning if Rule 65 can be read more loosely?” I prompt, “How do § 
1292(a)(1) and Rule 65 differ structurally?” 
A. Rule 65 is a rule, and § 1292(a)(1) is a statute. 
Q. Why should that make a difference? Who drafts and adopts rules, and 
who drafts and adopts statutes? 
A. The Supreme Court drafts (through advisory committees) and 
“prescribe[s]” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,20 and Congress drafts and 
enacts federal statutes.21 
Q. By what authority does Congress draft and enact statutes? 
A. The Constitution. 
Q. What provision? It is not based on the Commerce Clause or the taxing 
authority provisions of the Constitution most familiar to students.22 
A brief discussion could then occur here about Congress’s power to pass 
statutes in light of the Supreme Court’s current and important decision on the 
validity of the Affordable Care Act. The majority held that the Act was 
constitutional under the taxing provisions but not the Commerce Clause, 
holdings that drew vehement dissent.23 
 
 17. Chicago United Industries, 445 F.3d at 946, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 151. 
 18. Id., as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 151. 
 19. Judge Posner did, however, cite a number of cases holding the same, including 
Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Entersprises, 112 F.3d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1997), which noted that in a 
Supreme Court case involving the appealability of a TRO, the Court “fail[ed] to make a finding 
as to whether there had been notice before the restraining order was entered.” From that, the court 
in Nutrasweet “deduce[d] that the Court implicitly held that the existence of notice would not 
make the provisions of Rule 65(b) inapplicable.” Id. (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86–
88 (1974)). 
 20. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074 (2006). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 22. See id. art. I, § 8. 
 23. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591, 2600, 2642 (2012). 
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After the class discusses that Supreme Court holding, I then repeat, “What 
part of the Constitution authorizes Congress to draft § 1292(a)(1)?”24 
A. Article III. 
Q. What is the purpose of Article III? 
A. To establish the federal judiciary. 
Q. What federal courts does Article III establish? 
A. “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.”25 While Article III establishes the judiciary, a 
provision in Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the explicit power to 
“constitute” the lower federal courts.26 The courts that Congress “constitute[s]” 
only can hear disputes that Congress gives them jurisdiction to hear. Section 
1292(a)(1) is a subject matter jurisdiction statute. 
At this point, some students look as if they have just realized how Article 
III ties in with what they thought was a rather esoteric subject (appealability of 
TROs). Here, students see a jurisdictional statute beyond §§ 1331 and 1332 of 
Title 28, which they studied in Civil Procedure, and beyond other federal 
statutes providing for judicial review of federal agency actions, which they 
may have studied in courses on federal subject areas. 
Just to make one more point about the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I 
ask, “Why isn’t the appealability of a TRO part of § 1331, the statute 
governing federal question jurisdiction for federal courts?” 
A. Because § 1331 governs the jurisdiction of federal district courts.27 
Separate statutes are necessary to create and govern the jurisdiction of the 
federal appellate courts.28 
From there one can get briefly into issues usually devoted to a course in 
Federal Courts. I remind students that the only court established by the 
Constitution is the Supreme Court. District and circuit courts are established by 
Congress. 
 
 24. I post the language of Article I, Section 8 and Article III on the computer for students. It 
could also be displayed by a projector in class. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 26. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” Id. 
 27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 28. See id. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 1292(a)(1) (“Except 
as provided . . . the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). Just as there are separate statutes creating federal district and appellate courts, so too are 
there separate rules of procedure for each. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the 
procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . .”); FED. R. 
APP. P. 1(a)(1) (“These rules govern procedure in the United States courts of appeals.”). 
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Q. Does Article III require Congress to create any lower federal courts? 
A. No, it says, “[A]s the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”29 Thus, those courts exist only at the will of the legislative branch, 
which is a reason lower courts need federal jurisdictional statutes. 
Q. Can passage of jurisdictional statutes become political? 
A. Yes. Congress has the power to take away federal court jurisdiction in 
subject matter areas. For example, when the federal courts were enjoining 
labor disputes in the early twentieth century, Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, which provides in part: “No court of the United States shall 
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent 
injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute . . . .”30 In 
other times, when courts have granted controversial remedies, such as busing 
for school integration, Congress has tried to take away federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to order those remedies.31 
Q. What if Congress should decide to repeal all jurisdictional statutes? 
A. An unlikely event, but interesting to contemplate—what is the role of 
the federal district courts? Appellate courts? How would the country function 
without them? These questions reach the bottom line concept of the rule of 
law.32 These questions also provide a segue into the next case, which is less 
profound but discusses a difference between federal district and appellate 
courts. 
B. Injunctions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Federal Courts 
In Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. 
Griepentrog,33 Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina each had an agency 
that administered disposal of low-level radioactive waste in its state.34 These 
states had the only low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities in the United 
States at that time.35 In 1990, each agency forbade Michigan’s radioactive 
waste users from disposing of their waste at any of the three sites, on the 
 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2006). 
 31. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: 
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 895–96 (1984). 
 32. See generally Paul Gewirtz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L.J. 
1675 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005), and discussing Justice Breyer’s views on the importance of the rule of 
law); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
22 (1992) (discussing the rule of law in the context of Supreme Court rulings in controversial 
cases, and reviewing literature on the rule of law). 
 33. 945 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1991), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 160–65. 
 34. Id. at 152, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 160. 
 35. Id., as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 160–61. 
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ground that Michigan was not in compliance with a federal statute.36 The 
Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users filed suit in the District 
Court for the Western District of Michigan.37 That court permanently enjoined 
the state agencies from denying Michigan radioactive waste users access to 
their state disposal sites.38 The district court found that it had jurisdiction over 
the defendants because “the long-standing business relationship between the 
plaintiffs and defendants, coupled with the fact that the defendants’ actions 
were felt in Michigan, provided sufficient grounds for jurisdiction.”39 The state 
agencies appealed to the Sixth Circuit and sought from it a stay pending appeal 
of the district court’s permanent injunction order.40 The Sixth Circuit granted 
the stay because, in discussing the likelihood of success on the merits, “we feel 
it a close question as to whether the defendants’ contacts to Michigan were 
sufficient ‘such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there.’”41 After concluding that the likelihood of success was a close question, 
the appellate court applied the “serious question going to the merits” 
requirements for preliminary relief.42 It held that the state agencies would 
suffer irreparable injury if the ruling stood, harm to the plaintiffs and others 
was minimal, and that the public interest would not be served by the 
injunction.43 
I note that “the merits,” for purposes of deciding the likelihood of success, 
can include jurisdictional issues as well as all other issues that go to the 
strength of the plaintiff’s case. I ask students: 
Q. What type of jurisdiction is at issue here and what authority from the 
text of the opinion supports your answer? 
A. Personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit assessed the “defendants’ 
contacts to Michigan” and quoted World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson44 (a case students may well have studied in Civil Procedure). 
 
 36. Id., as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 161. 
 37. Id. at 150. 
 38. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d at 152, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 161. 
 39. Id. at 154, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 163. 
 40. Id. at 152, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 160. 
 41. Id. at 155 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980)), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 163. 
 42. Id. at 155, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 163–64. There is a dispute among the 
circuits, which is beyond the scope of this Article regarding teaching techniques, as to whether 
the “serious questions going to the merits” test survives the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, 
at 71. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–35 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35–
37 (2d Cir. 2010), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 83–85. 
 43. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d at 155, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 163–64. 
 44. 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that a defendant must have sufficient contacts with a 
jurisdiction so that it “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”). 
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Q. Why do you suppose the district court and the Sixth Circuit came to 
opposite conclusions as to personal jurisdiction? Where was the district court 
located? 
A. Michigan—this raises the question whether the Michigan court might 
have been too close to the interests of the Michigan plaintiff. 
Q. Is Michigan the only state in the Sixth Circuit? 
A. No, it also includes Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky. As of now, no 
circuit has only one state.45 
Q. Why do the circuits have more than one state? 
A. A possible reason is to avoid parochial decisions by a district court 
more familiar with and attuned to the interests of one state. Other reasons are 
efficiency and promoting more uniformity in the application of federal laws. 
I tell the students that a number of people have suggested that the Ninth 
Circuit is too big and should be split.46 The Fifth Circuit was split into the Fifth 
and Eleventh in 1981.47 The Fifth Circuit now has Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Texas; the Eleventh has Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.48 
Q. Why has the Ninth Circuit not been split? The Ninth Circuit contains 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington, as well as Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.49 
A. Possibly for a number of reasons. First, geographic. Separating one or 
more states from California would create a somewhat less populous circuit 
than at present while creating another considerably less populous circuit. 
Splitting California in half and allocating the remaining states to each half 
would raise the probability of having different federal decisional law for each 
half of California. Splitting all the other Ninth Circuit states from California 
would create a single state federal circuit, which would create risks of 
insularity, and loss of efficiency and uniformity of the laws. Second, political. 
Possibly an even more compelling explanation for the status quo is that, at 
present, California tends to be more liberal than the less populous states 
contained in the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit as a whole tends to be 
more liberal than some other federal circuits.50 Political differences in 
Congress would likely prevent agreement on whether and how to split it. 
 
 45. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). 
 46. See, e.g., David S. Law, How To Rig the Federal Courts, 99 GEO. L.J. 779, 789 (2011) 
(noting that the suggestions to split the Ninth Circuit “have been circulating for some time now”). 
 47. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 
1994. 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 41. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Law, supra note 46, at 789 (arguing that a major motivation of suggestions that the 
Ninth Circuit be split is “to quarantine the court’s liberal judges in a smaller, less powerful 
circuit” and possibly to prevent those judges “from deciding environmental cases of particular 
importance to the northwestern states in the circuit”). 
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Thus, in this unit, students go from discussing the requirements for a stay 
of restraining orders and injunctions to discussing the wisdom of Congress 
when it created the federal circuit courts. They also explore the wisdom of the 
founders in creating a federal judiciary to oversee a union of states with 
different interests. Of course, avoiding the primacy of parochial state interests 
is one of the very reasons for the creation of a federal judiciary, as is plain 
from the constitutional provisions for lifetime tenure and non-diminishing of 
compensation of federal judges,51 and the federal courts’ power, inter alia, over 
disputes concerning the Constitution and laws of the United States, and cases 
between two or more States, and citizens of different states.52 
II.  DAMAGES: CONFUSION CAUSED BY COMPARING TORT AND CONTRACT 
THEORIES 
A. Foreseeability 
In most law schools, Torts and Contracts are separate courses. The split is 
useful in teaching the subject matter of each, but limits consideration of their 
intersections and the confusions those cause. In my course in Remedies, I 
assume that students know the substance of tort and contract law from their 
first year. I do not assume, however, that they understand the differences 
between the two in measuring damages. Nor do I assume that they are familiar 
with the confusion caused by terminology that has different meanings in tort 
and contract. For example, I do not assume that students know that 
“consequential damages” in contracts are entirely different than “consequential 
damages” in torts. Nor do I assume that students know that “consequential 
damages” and “special damages” are synonymous in contracts, but that 
“special damages” are a subset of “consequential damages” in torts. 
To demonstrate the difference between tort and contract damages, I 
compare the general principles students know from torts with Hadley v. 
Baxendale, the leading contracts damages case. 
1. Torts 
Q. Assume a tortfeasor injures someone with an eggshell skull, to use a 
familiar example. What can the injured plaintiff recover? 
A. Damages to make him or her whole. 
Q. Would that include damages that come from the injured skull even 
though most people do not have such a fragile skull? Even though the 
tortfeasor did not know that the victim had an eggshell skull? 
 
 51. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 52. See id. art. III, § 2. 
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A. Yes, in torts generally one takes the victim as one finds him or her.53 
Q. What limits damages? 
A. Proximate cause, that is, damages that are no longer a consequence of 
the tort. 
2. Contracts 
Using the familiar (or what will become familiar) case of Hadley v. 
Baxendale,54 I ask 
Q. What was the contract in Hadley? 
A. The contract was for a carriage company to expedite the carriage of a 
miller’s broken crankshaft to the repair shop. The miller paid an extra fee for 
the special handling.55 
Q. What was the breach? 
A. The crankshaft delivery was delayed.56 
Q. What damages did the miller seek? 
A. His lost revenue from his customers because his mill could not run 
without the crankshaft.57 
Q. Was he able to recover them? 
A. No. The court held that special damages could only be recovered if 
“they were foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time 
the contract was made.”58 
Q. Looking at the contract between the parties, can you see why the court 
said that the lost revenues were not contemplated by the parties? Why was the 
loss of revenue damages considered “special”? 
A. The court in Hadley said that it would not necessarily follow that one 
damaged crankshaft would necessitate the closure of the mill.59 And there was 
nothing in the contract referencing customers of the mill. 
 
 53. Aisole v. Dean, 574 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (La. 1991), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 
378. 
 54. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
 55. Id. at 147 (The plaintiff’s “mill was stopped by a breakage of the crank shaft . . . . The 
plaintiffs’ servant told the clerk that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft must be sent 
immediately; and in answer to the inquiry when the shaft would be taken, the answer was, that if 
it was sent up by twelve o’clock any day, it would be delivered at Greenwich on the following 
day. . . . [T]he sum of 2l. 4s. was paid . . . at the same time the defendants’ clerk was told that a 
special entry, if required, should be made to hasten its delivery.”). 
 56. Id. (“The delivery of the shaft at Greenwich was delayed by some neglect . . . .”). 
 57. Id. (stating the plaintiffs lost “the profits they would otherwise have received”). 
 58. Am. List Corp. v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 549 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (N.Y. 1989) 
(citations omitted) (citing Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 145), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 
290. 
 59. See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151 (“Suppose the plaintiffs had another shaft in their 
possession put up or putting up at the time, and that they only wished to send back the broken 
shaft to the engineer who made it; it is clear that this would be quite consistent with the above 
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Q. Why doesn’t the defendant in Hadley take the plaintiff as he finds him, 
with a mill that is not running because of the broken crankshaft, as in torts? In 
other words, why doesn’t the court award the plaintiff his lost revenues? 
A. If the miller recovered his profits, shipping might be curtailed or 
become very expensive. Carriage companies might not want to take the risk of 
having to pay damages well in excess of what they expect to gain from the 
contract; rather, they might not ship goods without their owner or owner’s 
agent traveling with them. Or if carriage companies were willing to take the 
risk, they might need to raise their prices in order to cover the cost of that risk. 
Q. How are the goals of tort and of contract law similar and how do they 
differ? 
A. Both want to compensate plaintiffs. Damages in tort are designed to 
make the plaintiff whole.60 Damages in contract are designed to give the 
plaintiff the benefit of his or her bargain, but not more.61 They differ because a 
goal of tort law is to deter torts, while a goal of contract law is to compensate 
without deterring contracting. 
Q. To ask an obvious question, why not deter contracting? 
A. Society needs contracting to make commerce flow. Society, however, 
neither needs nor wants torts committed. 
Q. Are pain and suffering damages recoverable in contract law? 
A. No. Since pain and suffering damages can vary substantially from jury 
to jury, a contracting party would not be able to assess the potential risk of 
entering into a contract that might be breached. Thus, again, contracting could 
be deterred.62 
Q. Why is Hadley a desirable rule in modern society? Why shouldn’t a 
party who wants to protect itself from having to pay consequential (special) 
damages just include an exclusionary clause in a contract or buy insurance? 
A. Many contracts, especially many drafted by lawyers, do exclude 
payment of consequential damages, but requiring such a contract clause would 
disadvantage those who do not know the need for it and those who have very 
informal contracts. In addition, a well-established default rule brings stability 
in commercial relations. 
Q. Is there ever a circumstance in which personal injury damages can be 
recovered for a breach of contract? 
A. Yes, tort damages are available when a breach of contract is also an 
independent tort, causes physical bodily injury, or causes property damage to 
 
circumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay in the delivery would have no effect upon the 
intermediate profits of the mill.”). 
 60. See TEXT, supra note 1, at 283. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 988 (Cal. 1999), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 
1, at 307. 
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property that was not the subject of the contract.63 This answer is easy to state, 
but difficult to apply. 
B. Special Versus General Damages 
In contract law, special damages are also known as consequential 
damages.64 General damages “are those which are the natural and probable 
consequence of the breach, while special damages are extraordinary in that 
they do not so directly flow from the breach.”65 These definitions are not 
particularly useful unless one knows what is considered a “natural and 
probable consequence of the breach.” As the students have just discussed, 
“natural and probable” damages are those that are related to the explicit 
promises in the contract, not other unnamed consequences, no matter how 
proximately caused. 
General and special damages have different meanings in tort than they do 
in contract. I use Wheeler v. Huston,66 a personal injury case, to illustrate the 
distinction. There the jury awarded the defendant the exact amount of his 
special damages, which was an amount just over $9,000 to cover his lost wages 
and medical expenses.67 The issue in Wheeler was whether the jury could 
award special damages without awarding general damages.68 It turns out courts 
are divided as to the answer, which turns on what each state presumes that 
particular verdict means.69 
Q. What are general damages in tort according to Wheeler? 
A. Pain and suffering.70 
Q. What are special damages? 
 
 63. TEXT, supra note 1, at 308–09. 
 64. See Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 618 F. Supp. 2d 280, 292 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 292. 
 65. Am. List Corp. v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 549 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (N.Y. 1989) 
(citation omitted). 
 66. 605 P.2d 1339 (Or. 1980), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 293–97. 
 67. Id. at 1340, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 293. 
 68. Id. at 1340–41, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 294. 
 69. See id. at 1341–45, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 294–96. The question involves 
creating a rule, which makes a presumption as to what the award of special damages without 
general damages means. Does it mean that the jury compromised the verdict by awarding only 
specials when it believed that there were problems with the plaintiff’s case? Or does it mean that 
the jury misapplied the evidence in determining that there was no pain and suffering? Or does it 
mean something else? Courts in different jurisdictions create different presumptions. As this is a 
matter of state law, the rules need not be the same from state to state. 
 70. See id. at 1344 (“[W]e believe that the first verdict for special damages only was 
improper in this case, and that the court correctly refused to receive it. The evidence disclosed 
that plaintiff sustained an injury from the accident and that he sustained some pain and suffering.” 
(quoting Brannan v. Slemp, 490 P.2d 979, 983 (Or. 1971))). 
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A. Easily measurable monetary damages, such as lost wages and medical 
bills.71 
Q. Since both, if proven, are proximately caused by the tort, why do they 
need separate terms? 
A. Usually it does not matter because both are recoverable if proven.72 No 
extra proof is needed to recover one or the other. For some torts, however, such 
as defamation per quod or trespass to chattels, special damages are an element 
of the cause of action.73 Without special out-of-pocket monetary damages, 
there is no tort. 
Q. Why would there be such a rule? 
A. Defamation per quod involves statements that require explanation to be 
defamatory.74 Trespass to chattels involves an interference with a chattel, but 
not necessarily an interference that causes damage to the chattel or deprives its 
owner of its possession.75 To early common law courts, as well as modern 
courts, whether such torts cause any damage may be doubtful. Thus, if some 
measurable monetary harm can be traced to those torts, it demonstrates 
objectively that the torts caused damage and that they will be worth the court’s 
time to hear. 
III.  ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
A. The Distinction Between Law and Equity 
One of the important concepts students study in Remedies is the difference 
between law and equity. I find that most students in the class have only a 
vague idea of what equity is. To them, equity may only mean “fairness” or “the 
length of the chancellor’s foot.” While those are some definitions of the word 
equity, actions at equity are governed by procedures and provide relief 
different from actions at law. 
 
 71. See Wheeler, 605 P.2d at 1340 (“The plaintiff prayed . . . for special damages of 
$9,120.25 (lost wages of $6,000 and medical expenses of $3,120.25).”), as reprinted in TEXT, 
supra note 1, at 293. 
 72. See id. at 1345, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 296. The court in Wheeler did not 
need to decide whether different levels of proof had been established for an award of general and 
special damages; rather, it decided whether a jury could refuse to award general damages when a 
plaintiff had sustained an accident in which there were special damages. 
 73. See Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 726 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(defamation), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 1028; CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber 
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (trespass to chattels), as reprinted in 
TEXT, supra note 1, at 648. 
 74. See Tacket v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 937 F.2d 1201, 1204 (7th Cir. 
1991), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 1028. 
 75. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 648. 
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Differences between equitable and legal actions evolved from procedures 
governing early English tribunals. In earlier years, courts in law and equity in 
England were separate and had mutually exclusive jurisdictions.76 They also 
had mutually exclusive remedies. Equity courts, also known as the Courts of 
Chancery, issued orders directly to a defendant, in personam.77 Legal courts, 
also known as the King’s Courts, however, resolved disputes in rem, 
determining who was entitled to what property.78 
In most courts in the United States equitable and legal actions have been 
merged into one action.79 For example, Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure abolished the duality by providing: “There is one form of action—
the civil action.”80 The term “equitable jurisdiction” is a misnomer. Even 
England long ago abolished the jurisdictional distinction between law and 
equity.81 “Equitable jurisdiction” now refers to nonjurisdictional procedural 
differences between actions at equity and those at law.82 As a carryover from 
the two court system in early England, equitable remedies continue to be in 
personam and legal to be in rem.83 Students learn that equitable orders are 
court orders to a defendant to do or not do something, while legal judgments 
are court mandates determining whether or not a plaintiff is entitled to 
property, including money, from the defendant.84 While some students may 
initially view the difference between the two as nonmonetary versus monetary 
relief, they see cases holding monetary child support equitable but 
nonmonetary ejectment legal.85 
Students review the in personam/in rem concept when they read Kossian v. 
American National Insurance Co.,86 an unjust enrichment case in which a 
plaintiff, who had cleaned up property pursuant to a contract with its owner, 
 
 76. See TEXT, supra note 1, at 3. 
 77. Id. at 3–4. 
 78. Id. 
 79. A few states still maintain a distinction between legal and equitable actions. See id. at 10. 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
 81. TEXT, supra note 1, at 7. 
 82. In some circumstances, pursuant to the doctrine of “equitable clean-up,” a court ordering 
an equitable remedy will also award ancillary legal damages. Id. at 1373. Another difference 
between actions at law and equity is the availability of a jury trial at law, but not at equity. 
Sometimes the decision whether an action is legal or equitable for purposes of the right to a jury 
trial is based on the nature of the remedy; sometimes it is based on whether the cause of action 
was historically legal or equitable. Id. at 1355–1405. 
 83. See id. at 182 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 93–94 
(1973)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Wronke v. Madigan, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105–06 (C.D. Ill. 1998), as reprinted in 
TEXT, supra note 1, at 218 (child support); Heroux v. Katt, 68 A.2d 25, 28–29 (R.I. 1949), as 
reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 742 (ejectment). 
 86. 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 525–28. 
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sought compensation for his work from the company that later acquired the 
property after a bankruptcy proceeding.87 In that opinion, students see 
confusing statements such as an “equitable obligation imposed by law” and the 
“equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.”88 I direct students to the last 
substantive paragraph of the opinion where the court says “plaintiff should 
recover.”89 The court does not say “the defendant is ordered to.” Thus, the 
action is at law. 
B. Contempt 
1. Application of Criminal Law to Equitable Civil Procedures 
Actions at law and equity are both civil actions. Because of the in 
personam/in rem remedial distinction, issues of criminal law can arise in the 
enforcement of equitable, but not legal, remedies. A court cannot compel a 
defendant to pay an in rem judgment; rather, an officer such as a sheriff can 
attach property or assets to satisfy a monetary judgment, pursuant to plaintiff’s 
judgment lien.90 On the other hand, a court can enforce an equitable order 
directed to a defendant by fining or imprisoning the defendant in contempt.91 
A fine or prison contempt sanction can be either civil or criminal, which 
introduces criminal law into civil matters. If a court seeks to coerce a 
defendant into complying with an injunction, which will benefit the plaintiff, 
the contempt is civil.92 If a court seeks to punish the defendant for not 
complying with the order, the contempt is criminal.93 As cases such as 
International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell94 and Jones 
v. Clinton95 illustrate, determining whether a contempt sanction is civil or 
criminal can pose considerable difficulty. 
Once the students and I discuss the issues surrounding such a 
determination, I ask: 
Q. Why does the distinction matter? 
A. Courts must use criminal procedures in criminal contempt hearings and 
civil procedures in civil contempt hearings.96 
Q. What happens if a court fails to use criminal procedures in a criminal 
contempt? 
 
 87. Id. at 225–27, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 525–27. 
 88. See id. at 227, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 527. 
 89. Id. at 228, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 528. 
 90. TEXT, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 91. Id. at 4. 
 92. See TEXT, supra note 1, at 201. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 512 U.S. 821 (1994), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 221. 
 95. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 246–51. 
 96. See TEXT, supra note 1, at 201. 
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A. The criminal sanction is vacated.97 Therefore, it is important that a 
court, and the lawyers, know which is which. 
Q. Does a defendant who is considering actions that may violate an 
injunction know whether the contempt will be criminal or civil? 
A. Not necessarily since the determination occurs after the violation.98 
Thus, a lawyer should advise such a client that he or she could be found in 
criminal contempt. 
Q. How do criminal and civil procedures differ? 
Recalling their course in Criminal Procedure, students answer that criminal 
procedures include proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to a jury 
trial, to be free from self-incrimination, to notice, and to a hearing. 
Q. What procedures are required in a civil proceeding? 
Sometimes students have not focused on the fact that notice and a hearing 
are required by due process in civil as well as criminal proceedings. While 
Article III, § 2 and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provide the right 
to a jury trial in criminal cases, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not 
limited to criminal proceedings. They prohibit state and federal governments 
from depriving persons, whether through criminal or civil proceedings, of 
property without due process of law.99 I then say to the students: “As you have 
noted, one criminal procedural requirement is right to a jury trial.” And I ask 
further: 
Q. When are jury trials required in criminal contempt proceedings? 
A. The United States Supreme Court in Bloom v. Illinois applied to 
contempt cases the holding of Duncan v. Louisiana, which held that the 
Constitution requires states to provide jury trials in criminal cases where the 
punishment is two years imprisonment or more.100 The two cases were decided 
the same day. 
Q. Are criminal contempt hearings necessarily governed by the same 
procedures as criminal trials? Did the Supreme Court in Bloom merely cite 
Duncan to reach its conclusion? In other words, are criminal contempt 
hearings treated like other criminal cases for all purposes? 
A. Although the Supreme Court’s holding in Bloom was the same as in 
Duncan, its reasoning was different. In Bloom, the Court acknowledged that its 
prior precedent on criminal contempts had concluded, although in the context 
of a six-month criminal sanction, “that all criminal contempts can be 
 
 97. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 195 (1968), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 
188. 
 100. See id. at 211 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1968)), as reprinted in 
TEXT, supra note 1, at 192–93. 
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constitutionally tried without a jury.”101 The Court in Bloom held that “serious 
contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject to the 
jury trial provisions of the Constitution.”102 Therefore, criminal contemnors 
who are punished by imprisonment of two years or more are entitled to a jury 
trial. 
Contemnors who are imprisoned until they comply with an order are not 
entitled to a jury trial.103 Even though they may stay in prison longer than two 
years, they can choose to leave the prison at any time.104 Their contempt 
proceeding is to benefit the plaintiff, not to punish the defendant.105 
2. Differences Between Criminal and Equitable Procedures 
Despite the similarities between criminal contempts and other crimes, there 
are significant differences. Students study one difference when they study the 
collateral bar rule in the five to four Supreme Court decision in Walker v. City 
of Birmingham.106 In Walker, the defendants were Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and others.107 They were planning to march on Good Friday and Easter Sunday 
to protest segregation, but were served with a temporary injunction issued by a 
state court to enforce an anti-picketing ordinance and to prevent the march.108 
The defendants chose not to seek further state court review before they 
marched.109 After a hearing at which the defendants were not permitted to 
challenge the constitutionality of the injunction, they were held in contempt 
and each was sentenced to five days in jail and to a $50 fine.110 
The Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction and upheld the state 
court’s use of its collateral bar rule, a rule that prevents a defendant, who did 
not obtain an order modifying or vacating an injunction before violating it, 
from arguing that the injunction was unconstitutional or otherwise improperly 
issued.111 That rule permits a defendant to argue during the contempt hearing 
only that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue the injunction, that the 
defendant did not have notice of the injunction, or that the defendant did not 
violate the injunction. 
 
 101. Id. at 197, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 188. 
 102. Id. at 198, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 188. 
 103. See TEXT, supra note 1, at 195–96. 
 104. See Wronke v. Madigan, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Ill. 1998), as reprinted in 
TEXT, supra note 1, at 218. 
 105. Id. at 1105, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 218. 
 106. 388 U.S. 307 (1967), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 263–74. 
 107. Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 272. 
 108. Id. at 309–11 (majority opinion), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 263–64. 
 109. Id. at 310, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 264. 
 110. Id. at 311–12, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 264–65. 
 111. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 320–21, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 267. 
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The majority reasoned that “no man can be judge in his own case.”112 The 
dissenters argued that the state should not bar a challenge to an ordinance that 
is unconstitutional “on its face”113 and that the majority “elevat[ed] a state rule 
of judicial administration above the right of free expression.”114 At this point, 
students can debate the wisdom of the collateral bar rule, which not all 
jurisdictions have.115 
In discussing the rule in the context of Walker, I direct students to the 
holding in Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne, in which 
the Court held that an ex parte restraining order prohibiting a “‘white 
supremacist” organization from holding a rally was a prior restraint of speech 
in violation of the First Amendment.116 I also direct students to Shuttlesworth 
v. City of Birmingham, in which the Supreme Court unanimously reversed 
Shuttlesworth’s conviction, holding that the anti-picketing ordinance at issue in 
Walker violated the First Amendment.117 
This leads to additional questions and answers, which are designed to 
again cause students to review more concepts from criminal and constitutional 
law and to expand the discussion of Walker. 
Q. If someone violated an injunction after a definitive judicial ruling in 
another case established the unconstitutionality of the ordinance on which the 
injunction was based, would the collateral bar rule still apply? 
A. The policies of that rule would no longer be served, as the Court in 
Walker acknowledged when it said: “[T]his is not a case where the injunction 
was transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity.”118 
Q. Why could Dr. King and others not raise the constitutionality of their 
conviction, but Fred Shuttlesworth, who marched at the same time, could? 
A. Shuttlesworth had been convicted of violating the anti-picketing 
ordinance.119 Dr. King, et al., had been convicted of violating the injunction 
that prohibited them from violating the ordinance.120 
Q. Why should that make a difference? 
A. Because of the difference between an ordinance (or statute) and an 
injunction prohibiting violation of an ordinance (or statute). At a criminal trial, 
a defendant can raise the unconstitutionality or other infirmity of the ordinance 
 
 112. Id. at 320, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 267. 
 113. See id. at 328 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); id. at 336 (Douglas, J., dissenting), as reprinted 
in TEXT, supra note 1, at 270. 
 114. Id. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 270. 
 115. See TEXT, supra note 1, at 262. 
 116. 393 U.S. 175, 176, 180 (1968), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 168–69. 
 117. 394 U.S. 147, 148–52, 159 (1969), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 274–75. 
 118. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967), as reprinted in TEXT, supra 
note 1, at 266. 
 119. Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 274. 
 120. Walker, 388 U.S. at 311–12, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 264–65. 
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or statute that the defendant is accused of violating,121 unless the ordinance or 
statute provides an alternative forum for its challenge.122 At a contempt 
hearing, however, the collateral bar rule can be used to prohibit a defendant 
from challenging the underlying merits of an injunction.123 
To answer the next question, students review the case or controversy 
provision of Article III,124 including concepts of ripeness and standing. 
Q. Why should whether one violates an ordinance or an injunction make a 
difference as to one’s ability to raise the merits? 
A. It is difficult to challenge a proposed violation of a statute before 
violating it. A person seeking to violate a statute would be a plaintiff suing the 
government for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Federal courts 
will dismiss such a challenge if no case or controversy has yet arisen.125 A 
challenge to a statute may not be ripe, or the plaintiff may not have standing. 
Perhaps officials will not view the action that the plaintiff plans to take as a 
violation of the statute or will not prosecute it. Perhaps the plaintiff will not 
undertake the proposed action.126 
In contrast, because a contempt hearing involves noncompliance with a 
court order, there is a case and controversy that has already been adjudicated, 
or preliminarily adjudicated. A court, therefore, already has jurisdiction and 
can, at least in theory, quickly hear a motion to vacate or to modify the 
injunction.127 
 
 121. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 
1019 (holding that only in very narrow circumstances may a federal court enjoin a state criminal 
proceeding on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, noting that the pending 
state proceeding “afford[s] Harris an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims”). 
 122. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429–31 (1944) (holding that because the 
Emergency Price Control Act provided that a maximum price regulation could be protested 
administratively and that the Emergency Court of Appeals and Supreme Court had exclusive 
jurisdiction of any appeal, defendant who did not use this procedure could not raise invalidity of 
regulation during criminal trial for its violation). 
 123. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 320–21, as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 267. 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 125. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937) (holding that the 
limitation of the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 “to ‘cases of actual controversy,’ manifestly 
has regard to the constitutional provision”), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 1, at 622. 
 126. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459–60 (1974), as reprinted in TEXT, supra note 
1, at 634. 
 127. If defendants are prevented from being heard quickly, then the collateral bar rule should 
not apply. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 318 (suggesting that the collateral bar rule would not apply 
had defendants “been met with delay or frustration of their constitutional claims”), as reprinted in 
TEXT, supra note 1, at 266. 
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CONCLUSION 
One can see from this discussion some of the ways in which a course in 
Remedies can be taught so that it weaves together concepts from a number of 
subjects that students were, or should have been, exposed to earlier in law 
school. By reviewing these concepts in an upper-level course, students are 
often surprised how they come together. As those concepts come together, 
students see a more complete picture of the “seamless web” of the law. The 
more complete the picture, the greater the understanding. The greater the 
understanding, the greater the ability to remember and apply the concepts. 
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